Naval Reactors History Database (nrhdb)
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1Title:  NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE): Naval Reactors safety assurance Add
 Summary:  As noted in the Executive Summary, "the NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE) was undertaken to identify practices and procedures and to share lessons learned in the Navy's submarine and NASA's human space flight programs" (iv). NASA benchmarked Naval Reactors because of its "high reliability...provid[ing] the most meaningful comparison to NASA's human-rated space flight program" (4). A number of principles developed by the program's first director, Hyman G. Rickover, are analyzed, including the importance of a flat organizational structure that supports informed dissent; responsibility through ownership of a job, longevity, and technical expertise; and, the need for embedding safety principles in all aspects of a program's work. 
 Source:  http://www.worldcat.org/title/nasanavy-benchmarking-exchange-nnbe-volume-ii-progress-report-naval-nuclear-submarine-safety-assurance/oclc/52891042 
 Date:  15 July 2003 
 Subject(s):  Reactor safety | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
 Format:  PDF 
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2Title:  TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force: Final report Add
 Summary:  This report describes some long-term goals designed to improve reactor safety in the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI-2) in March 1979. It was produced by the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force, an interdisciplinary group created by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the aftermath of the accident This report is relevant to naval nuclear propulsion in two ways. First, it describes design and operational issues for pressurized water reactors; both TMI-2 and the United States Navy's nuclear-powered vessels use the PWR design. Second, the report cites the concept of responsibility in the Naval Reactors program and the need to apply it in the commercial power industry: "In the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, Admiral Rickover has insisted that there be acceptance of personal responsibility throughout the program and that the designer, draftsman, or workman, and their supervisors and managers are responsible for their work and, if a mistake is made, it is necessary that those responsible acknowledge it and take corrective actions to prevent recurrence" (2-3). The report describes a range of remedies to improve reactor safety in commercial power plants. A special point of emphasis, given the circumstances of the accident at TMI-2, is on emergency operating procedures. Stating that the NRC's review of emergency operating procedures was inadequate, the report describes their essential elements: "Emergency operating procedures should consider system interactions and be written in such a manner that they are unambiguous and useful in crisis control. They should be based on thorough engineering evaluation and realistic analyses of the dynamic response of the nuclear power plant" (2-6). 
 Source:  http://www.osti.gov/bridge 
 Date:   1979 
 Subject(s):  Reactor safety | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
 Format:  PDF 
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3Title:  Hazards of military reactors Add
 Summary:  This collection of reports from 1961 and 1962 provide information on the hazards of military reactor plants, including issues relating to port visits for nuclear-powered ships and submarines. One of the most interesting documents is a 1959 letter (pages 47-49) from AEC chairman John McCone to Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations. It emphasizes the AEC's oversight responsibility for nuclear propulsion while noting that the Navy's operational control of nuclear-powered vessels. The letter also provides some insights into the AEC's role in reactor development oversight ("the design of each new class of reactors Is summarized in a Reactor Hazards Summary Report and presented by the Naval Reactors Branch and the reactor contractor for review by the Commission's safeguards staff and by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards")(48). One of the reports includes nformation on the Naval Reactors program's approach to the discharge of low-level radioactive fluids, including data on the amount of radioactivity discharged during 1960 (page 29). 
 Source:  https://www.osti.gov/opennet/servlets/purl/1047049/1047049.pdf 
 Date:  circa 1962 
 Subject(s):  Reactor safety | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
 Format:  PDF 
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4Title:  TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force: Status report and short-term recommendations Add
 Summary:  This document, known as NUREG-0578, was created by the Lessons Learned Task Force, an interdisciplinary group formed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island (TMI-2) accident, which occurred on 28 March 1979. Of particular interest is the section on short-term recommendations, in which the task force proposes changes to operating procedures given the circumstances of the TMI-2 accident (a loss of feed in the secondary system, followed by a loss of coolant accident [LOCA] in the primary system of the pressurized water reactor, with resulting core damage). Several recommendations stand out. First, providing emergency power for critical services, such as pressurizer level indicator, pressurizer heaters, and power-operated control values. Second, performing periodic checking of primary system safety and relief valves. Third, and critically, ensuring that operators are trained to better diagnose "low reactor coolant level and inadequate core cooling using existing reactor instrumentation (flow, temperature, power, etc.)" (8). While the recommendations as a whole are focused on commercial power reactor plants, many of these operational recommendations are applicable to the pressurized water reactors operated in the Navy's submarine and surface force. 
 Source:  http://www.osti.gov/bridge 
 Date:   1979 
 Subject(s):  Reactor safety | Nuclear engineering | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
 Format:  PDF 
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5Title:  Statement of Admiral H.G. Rickover, USN before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives Add
 Summary:  In the aftermath of the March 1979 reactor accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, Admiral Hyman Rickover, director of the Navy's nuclear propulsion program, was invited to submit information on the Naval Reactors program to a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee investigating the accident. At the time, Rickover's program was responsible for the operation of 153 reactors, including shipboard and prototype plants and the reactor at the commercial Shippingport Atomic Power Station. His statement describes, in depth, the values and training process in the Naval Reactors program. Rickover notes that "reactor safety requires adherence to a total concept wherein all elements are recognized as important and each is constantly reinforced" (7). For example, plant design and operator training are integrally related to one another, and this is reflected in the program's approach to both areas. On pages 14-16, Rickover describes his philosophy of conservatism in terms of plant design. Most notably, U.S. naval nuclear propulsion plants are designed to be inherently stable; unlike the Three Mile Island plant, they rely on operator instead of automatic reactor control; and, actual nuclear propulsion plants, not simulators, are used for the training of plant operators. Most of the statement focuses on the operator training process in the program. Rickover describes two primary objectives for the training program. Trainees are taught: "1) the principles of science and engineering which are fundamental to the design, construction, and operation of naval nuclear propulsion plants; and (2) the details and practical knowledge needed to operate and operations these plants" (35-36). The two primary components of the training are Nuclear Power School, which provides the theoretical foundation for officers and enlisted trainees, and prototype training; the operation of both schools is described in great depth, clearly indicating the importance that Rickover placed upon training in ensuring the safe operation of naval nuclear propulsion plants. In the hands-on prototype training for officers and enlisted trainees, Rickover emphasizes the different phases of training (classroom and in-hull) and the variety of assessment methods used (including oral checkouts on plant systems, watchstander observation, written examinations, and oral boards). There are some legibility problems in this digital document. 
 Source:  http://www.taproot.com/content/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/RickeoverCongressionalTestimony.pdf 
 Date:  24 May 1979 
 Subject(s):  Reactor safety | Rickover, Hyman G. | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
 Format:  PDF 
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6Title:  Naval reactor program and Polaris missile system Add
 Summary:  This document is the public record of a Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearing on the Polaris missile submarine program. The hearing was conducted on board the USS George Washington, the first ballistic missile submarine, which was powered by the already-proven S5W reactor. The record describes the integration of nuclear propulsion technology, proven in earlier submarines such as the Nautilus, and ballistic missile technology, under the oversight of Admiral William F. Raborn. Its introduction describes the Joint Committee's focus on reactor safety, mentioning the 1961 SL-1 accident at the Idaho National Laboratory and the importance of the design, construction, and operation standards created by Naval Reactors: "The committee also looks to the Navy to meet the Atomic Energy Commission's safety standards in all aspects of its nuclear propulsion program and to resist any pressures to force this new technology into an old system which may have sufficed for ordinary propulsion" (VI). In his testimony, Admiral Hyman Rickover (Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion) notes that the first three Polaris subs were originally designed as attack submarines and converted to ballistic missile submarines. (All of these submarines were powered by the S5W reactor plant.) Rickover describes the unique aspects of the Naval Reactors program (for example, its close collaboration with Atomic Energy Commission laboratories and land prototypes in plant testing). The document includes correspondence between the Navy, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the AEC's Safeguards Committee, and the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The Joint Committee's ongoing and strong support of Admiral Rickover and the Naval Reactors program is reflected in an opening letter from its chair and ranking member to the Secretary of the Navy (pages 10 and 11 of the hearing document). 
 Source:  http://tinyurl.com/cj5c652 
 Date:  09 April 1960 
 Subject(s):  S5W | Reactor safety | Rickover, Hyman G. | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
 Format:  PDF 
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7Title:  Rickover and the nuclear navy: The discipline of technology Add
 Summary:  An official history of the Naval Reactors program written by the late Francis Duncan. Duncan was co-author of Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962, the foundational history of the program. 
 Source:  http://energy.gov/management/downloads/duncan-rickover-and-nuclear-navy 
 Date:   1990 
 Subject(s):  Naval Reactors | Rickover, Hyman G. | USS Thresher (SSN-593) | USS Nimitz (CVN-68) | Reactor safety 
 Type:  Text 
 Format:  PDF 
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