720 Naval Reactors History Database (subject=Reactor safety;subject-join=exact;smode=simple;brand=default);subject-join%3Dexact;smode%3Dsimple;brand%3Ddefault Results for your query: subject=Reactor safety;subject-join=exact;smode=simple;brand=default Mon, 01 Jan 1962 12:00:00 GMT Hazards of military reactors. This collection of reports from 1961 and 1962 provide information on the hazards of military reactor plants, including issues relating to port visits for nuclear-powered ships and submarines. One of the most interesting documents is a 1959 letter (pages 47-49) from AEC chairman John McCone to Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations. It emphasizes the AEC's oversight responsibility for nuclear propulsion while noting that the Navy's operational control of nuclear-powered vessels. The letter also provides some insights into the AEC's role in reactor development oversight ("the design of each new class of reactors Is summarized in a Reactor Hazards Summary Report and presented by the Naval Reactors Branch and the reactor contractor for review by the Commission's safeguards staff and by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards")(48). One of the reports includes nformation on the Naval Reactors program's approach to the discharge of low-level radioactive fluids, including data on the amount of rad... Thu, 01 Jan 1970 12:00:00 GMT NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE): Naval Reactors safety assurance. NASA Office of Safety & Mission Assurance. NAVSEA 08 Naval Reators. NAVSEA 07Q Submarine Safety & Quality Assurance Division. As noted in the Executive Summary, "the NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE) was undertaken to identify practices and procedures and to share lessons learned in the Navy's submarine and NASA's human space flight programs" (iv). NASA benchmarked Naval Reactors because of its "high reliability...provid[ing] the most meaningful comparison to NASA's human-rated space flight program" (4). A number of principles developed by the program's first director, Hyman G. Rickover, are analyzed, including the importance of a flat organizational structure that supports informed dissent; responsibility through ownership of a job, longevity, and technical expertise; and, the need for embedding safety principles in all aspects of a program's work. Tue, 15 Jul 2003 12:00:00 GMT Naval reactor program and Polaris missile system. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy This document is the public record of a Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearing on the Polaris missile submarine program. The hearing was conducted on board the USS George Washington, the first ballistic missile submarine, which was powered by the already-proven S5W reactor. The record describes the integration of nuclear propulsion technology, proven in earlier submarines such as the Nautilus, and ballistic missile technology, under the oversight of Admiral William F. Raborn. Its introduction describes the Joint Committee's focus on reactor safety, mentioning the 1961 SL-1 accident at the Idaho National Laboratory and the importance of the design, construction, and operation standards created by Naval Reactors: "The committee also looks to the Navy to meet the Atomic Energy Commission's safety standards in all aspects of its nuclear propulsion program and to resist any pressures to force this new technology into an old system which may have sufficed for ordinary propulsion" (VI). In his testimony, Ad... Sat, 09 Apr 1960 12:00:00 GMT Rickover and the nuclear navy: The discipline of technology. Francis Duncan An official history of the Naval Reactors program written by the late Francis Duncan. Duncan was co-author of Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962, the foundational history of the program. Mon, 01 Jan 1990 12:00:00 GMT Statement of Admiral H.G. Rickover, USN before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives. In the aftermath of the March 1979 reactor accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, Admiral Hyman Rickover, director of the Navy's nuclear propulsion program, was invited to submit information on the Naval Reactors program to a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee investigating the accident. At the time, Rickover's program was responsible for the operation of 153 reactors, including shipboard and prototype plants and the reactor at the commercial Shippingport Atomic Power Station. His statement describes, in depth, the values and training process in the Naval Reactors program. Rickover notes that "reactor safety requires adherence to a total concept wherein all elements are recognized as important and each is constantly reinforced" (7). For example, plant design and operator training are integrally related to one another, and this is reflected in the program's approach to both areas. On pages 14-16, Rickover describes his philosophy of conservatism in terms of plant design. Most nota... Thu, 24 May 1979 12:00:00 GMT TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force: Final report. This report describes some long-term goals designed to improve reactor safety in the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI-2) in March 1979. It was produced by the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force, an interdisciplinary group created by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the aftermath of the accident This report is relevant to naval nuclear propulsion in two ways. First, it describes design and operational issues for pressurized water reactors; both TMI-2 and the United States Navy's nuclear-powered vessels use the PWR design. Second, the report cites the concept of responsibility in the Naval Reactors program and the need to apply it in the commercial power industry: "In the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, Admiral Rickover has insisted that there be acceptance of personal responsibility throughout the program and that the designer, draftsman, or workman, and their supervisors and managers are responsible for their work and, if a mistake is made, it is necessary that those responsible ac... Mon, 01 Jan 1979 12:00:00 GMT TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force: Status report and short-term recommendations. This document, known as NUREG-0578, was created by the Lessons Learned Task Force, an interdisciplinary group formed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island (TMI-2) accident, which occurred on 28 March 1979. Of particular interest is the section on short-term recommendations, in which the task force proposes changes to operating procedures given the circumstances of the TMI-2 accident (a loss of feed in the secondary system, followed by a loss of coolant accident [LOCA] in the primary system of the pressurized water reactor, with resulting core damage). Several recommendations stand out. First, providing emergency power for critical services, such as pressurizer level indicator, pressurizer heaters, and power-operated control values. Second, performing periodic checking of primary system safety and relief valves. Third, and critically, ensuring that operators are trained to better diagnose "low reactor coolant level and inadequate core cooling using existing reactor... Mon, 01 Jan 1979 12:00:00 GMT