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1Title:  Naval reactors physics handbook. Volume 1, Selected basic techniques Add
 Chapter title:  "Reactor physics and its application to nuclear power reactors" 
 Summary:  This chapter, written by physicist Alvin Radkowsky, summarizes the design challenges of submarine reactors in comparison with the natural uranium graphite reactors that had been designed and built during World War II. For example, Radkowsky describes the novelty ("close spacing") and design complexity of the control rod arrangement in PWRs (4). He also describes the parallel track of reactor development overseen by NR, with the intermediate range research supporting the S1G and S2G reactors performed by the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory; and, research supporting the Submarine Thermal Reactor (STR, or the S1W and S2W reactors) led by the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory. He notes that while the intermediate range reactor approach had, by 1964, been abandoned in favor of the pressurized water reactor (PWR) design, that "fuel loading densities are often sufficiently high [so] that a substantial fraction of the fissions occurs above thermal neutron energies" (2). As a result, some research relating to the intermediate range reactor could be applied to the design of PWRs. Radkowsky also summarizes some design contrasts between submarine reactors and the reactors for the Shippingport Atomic Power Station, with the latter relying on fuels with high U-238 composition. 
 Source:  http://www.osti.gov/bridge 
 Date:   1964 
 Subject(s):  Reactor physics | Nuclear engineering | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
 Format:  PDF 
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2Title:  Nuclear propulsion for naval surface vessels Add
 Summary:  This Joint Committee on Atomic Energy document, published in 1964, is centered on Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara's 1963 decision to make CV-67 (later commissioned as the USS John F. Kennedy) a conventionally-powered, oil-fired carrier. As committee chairman Sen. John Pastore notes in the hearing, one critical point of concern is the degree to which this decision represented a policy statement by the Defense Department on nuclear propulsion for surface ships generally and aircraft carriers specifically. Also, during the testimony of Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth, Pastore and other committee members express frustration over Korth's inability to cite any Defense Department officials opposed to making the CV-67 nuclear-powered (even though Korth testifies that both he and Chief of Naval Operations David McDonald supported nuclear propulsion for the carrier). During the hearing, Pastore also cites the Joint Committee's leadership on atomic power (including the development of the hydrogen bomb and the construction of the USS Nautilus, the world's first nuclear-powered submarine). Pastore notes that McNamara's decision on CV-67 was counter to the committee's wishes. As Chet Holifield notes during the hearing, this decision makes it difficult for the Joint Committee to continue to fund research on naval reactors applications. Dr. Harold Brown (later Secretary of Defense under President Carter) testifies in support of McNamara's decision. The advantages of nuclear propulsion for aircraft carriers, as demonstrated in the USS Enterprise, are central to the dispute over CV-67. Brown asserts that "nuclear propulsion may provide a means of achieving a major increase in the combat capabilities of surface warships, as it has done in the case of submarines, but it is not certain at this time that such will be the case." In contrast, Korth, McDonald, and Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover of Naval Reactors all testify in support of CV-67 being built as a nuclear-powered carrier because of the capabilities demonstrated by the Enterprise following its commissioning in November 1961. During the hearing, Admiral Rickover testifies on reactor development, noting that a four reactor carrier could be installed in the CV-67 that would generate the same power as the Enterprise's eight reactors. This would reduce operating personnel costs relative to the Enterprise's eight A2W reactors. Additionally, the time between refueling would be lengthened for the four reactor carrier, compared with the Enterprise's reactor plants. In one sense, the Joint Committee's resistance to McNamara's ruling on CV-67 did have a long-term effect, in that the John F. Kennedy was the final oil-fired aircraft carrier to be appropriated and constructed. 
 Source:  http://collections.stanford.edu/atomicenergy/bin/detail?fileID=1228277303 
 Date:   1964 
 Subject(s):  Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
 Format:  PDF 
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