Naval Reactors History Database (nrhdb)
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 Title:  NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE): Naval Reactors safety assurance Add
 Summary:  As noted in the Executive Summary, "the NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE) was undertaken to identify practices and procedures and to share lessons learned in the Navy's submarine and NASA's human space flight programs" (iv). NASA benchmarked Naval Reactors because of its "high reliability...provid[ing] the most meaningful comparison to NASA's human-rated space flight program" (4). A number of principles developed by the program's first director, Hyman G. Rickover, are analyzed, including the importance of a flat organizational structure that supports informed dissent; responsibility through ownership of a job, longevity, and technical expertise; and, the need for embedding safety principles in all aspects of a program's work. 
 Source:  http://www.worldcat.org/title/nasanavy-benchmarking-exchange-nnbe-volume-ii-progress-report-naval-nuclear-submarine-safety-assurance/oclc/52891042 
 Date:  15 July 2003 
 Subject(s):  Reactor safety | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
 Format:  PDF 
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 Title:  NASA's organizational and management challenges in the wake of the Columbia disaster Add
 Summary:  This document describes a House Science Committee hearing on changes to NASA's organizational structure and culture following the loss of the space shuttle Columbia in 2003. Naval Reactors was one of several organizations identified as "model safety organizations" whose examples could be used to help guide changes at NASA (4). The prepared statement of Admiral Skip Bowman (Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion), is included in the document. Bowman testified on the program's "culture of safety" and the fact that safety is "mainstreamed" throughout the Naval Reactors program, from its research laboratories to contractor relationships, and to its operators in the fleet (18). He described the organizational structure of NR and its relatively small size (380 civilian and military employees in 2003), given the scope and complexity of the projects that it manages. Admiral Bowman also describes the importance of training in the program and his direct oversight role in this area. Bowman's statement followed work between NASA and Naval Reactors, a benchmarking exchange effort that identified practices in the Naval Reactors and submarine programs that would be potentially applicable to human space flight. In the panel session, Admiral Bowman expanded on the organizational structure of NR, noting that he had 21 line managers at NR headquarters reporting directly to him in "one of the flattest organizations in this country, and certainly within the United States Government" (47). Within this structure, Bowman asserted, schedule pressure is not allowed to dominate the balance between schedule, costs, and safety. In a post-hearing response, Bowman described NR's hands-on involvement with safety in the program's reactor plants: "My staff and I are personally informed of or briefed on every significant naval nuclear propulsion plant problem; from this, we determine if additional causes need to be identified or if additional corrective actions (technical or administrative) need to be taken" (74). He listed Reactor Safeguards Examinations as a proactive way for NR to ensure that reactors are being safely operated. Admiral Bowman also described his dual military/civilian appointment; as an Assistant Secretary of Energy, the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion has "the final say over whether a Reactor is safe to operate" (52). Another point of interest is the program's view towards dissenting opinions, whether it is from one of the prime contractor laboratories or from headquarters' staff. Admiral Bowman described an environment in which dissenting opinions are documented and factored into the Director's decision-making, and one in which "there cannot be any fear of reprisal for raising concerns or issues" (81). 
 Source:  http://www.fdsys.gov/ 
 Date:  29 October 2003 
 Subject(s):  Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
 Format:  PDF 
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 Title:  National Nuclear Security Administration: Executive summary, FY 2004 Congressional budget request Add
 Summary:  This budget request describes the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which was created in 2000 and oversees the Office of Naval Reactors. The document has detailed budget information for Naval Reactors facilities for the 2002 and 2003 fiscal years, and information on requests for FY 2004. The Transformational Technology Core (TTC) Pressurized Water Reactor ("a new design reactor core") is mentioned in the Naval Reactors summary (12). 
 Source:  http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/04budget/content/NNSAADM/NNSASUM.pdf 
 Date:   2003 
 Subject(s):  Budgetary information | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  The Nautilus approaches New York City, 1958 Add
 Summary:  The USS Nautilus, following the successful completion of her 1958 transpolar voyage. Admiral Hyman Rickover's joint Navy/Atomic Energy Commission organization led the creation of the Nautilus. Under Naval Reactors, Westinghouse was responsible for the design and construction of the land-based S1W prototype reactor plant and the S2W plant that powered the Nautilus. Electric Boat constructed the Nautilus and was a subcontractor to Westinghouse for construction of the S1W prototype's hull. 
 Source:  http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/history/subhistory2.html 
 Reference:  Hewlett, Richard G., and Francis Duncan. Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974, pages 158-161. 
 Date:  25 August 1958 
 Subject(s):  S2W | USS Nautilus (SSN-571) | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Image 
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 Title:  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Progam Add
 Summary:  This Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearing document includes lengthy testimony by Admiral Hyman Rickover, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion. It covers a wide range of issues related to the United States Navy's use of nuclear propulsion. As noted in the forward, "the Joint Committee has long recognized the significant military advantages nuclear power provides surface warships" (iii). The hearing is a response to the Department of Defense's (DOD's) proposal to construct two conventionally-powered destroyers after Congress authorized a nuclear-powered frigate in fiscal year 1966. In his testimony, Rickover describes this decision as parallel to earlier "failure[s] of imagination and judgment" regarding the use of nuclear propulsion for submarines and aircraft carriers (11). Based upon this hearing, "the Joint Committee recommend[ed] that the Congress change the fiscal year 1967 Department of Defense authorization to require the two new destroyers to be nuclear-powered ships" (vii). The hearing includes a discussion of budget issues related to the committee's interest in reversing this recommendation. Defense secretary Robert McNamara's lengthy opposition to nuclear-powered carriers is referenced in the forward: "The recommendation of the Joint Committee that a nuclear propulsion plant be installed in the fiscal year 1963 aircraft carrier, the John F. Kennedy, in lieu of the planned conventional propulsion plant was not accepted by the Department of Defense" (iv). However, in March 1966, McNamara accepted nuclear propulsion for the next aircraft carrier (hull number 68). In his testimony, Admiral Rickover notes that this carrier will be powered by two nuclear reactors, which he estimated, would support the ship's propulsion for 13 years before refueling. In describing the engineering approach of Naval Reactors, Rickover asserts that the core lives of submarines and ships had been extended "by building and testing prototypes of these new cores, not by merely making paper studies" (5). He then links DOD's (under McNamara) dependence on cost studies to the slow application of nuclear propulsion to the surface fleet. One of the news items inserted into the record at Rickover's request quotes Captain James Holloway, then captain of the USS Enterprise, who described Enterprise's performance in the Vietnam War: "The deeper you get into a combat situation the more advantages you see to nuclear power" (7). Rickover also describes the fact that the planned two reactor carrier would carry almost twice the amount of aviation fuel and 50 percent more ammunition compared with a conventionally-powered carrier. Finally, Admiral Rickover describes training in the nuclear propulsion program for officers and enlisted candidates, including the theoretical (Nuclear Power School) and practical (prototype training) components, which remain in place today. He notes that the training "emphasizes principles and understanding of fundamentals instead of memorization" (16). 
 Source:  http://collections.stanford.edu/atomicenergy/bin/search/advanced/process?clauseMapped%28catKey%29=3162419&sort=title 
 Date:   1966 
 Subject(s):  Rickover, Hyman G. | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program--1967-8 Add
 Summary:  This Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearing document includes the unclassified testimony of Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion. He testified on two dates, March 7, 1967 and February 8, 1968. The Forward describes the Joint Committee's ongoing advocacy for surface nuclear propulsion, specifically for an increase in the number of guided missile cruisers to serve as escorts for nuclear-powered carriers. (The second nuclear-powered carrier, the USS Nimitz, had been authorized by this date.) Regarding submarines, the Forward notes Department of Defense cuts to nuclear submarine construction and the parallel with earlier Joint Committee leadership on nuclear propulsion: "Because of the inability of the Department of Defense to recognize the importance of nuclear submarines, the Joint Committee had to arrange for the Atomic Energy Commission to buy the propulsion plants for the first two nuclear submarines, Nautilus and Seawolf, in addition to funding the development work and the land prototypes. Similar action may be necessary at this time to insure the aggressive development of improved nuclear attack submarines" (IX). During his 1967 testimony, Rickover describes the current state of the nuclear propulsion program, with "110 nuclear ships in operation, under construction, or authorized" (13). He cites a major point of contention between the Joint Committee and the Executive Branch, a request for two non-nuclear escort vessels in the 1968 shipbuilding program, and much of his testimony focuses on the benefits of nuclear propulsion for major warships, including escorts. Rickover also describes difficulties in working with the two primary vendors used by Naval Reactors, General Electric and Westinghouse. He reports on the refusal of both companies to formally bid on turbine generator equipment for a submarine, arguing that the rigorous oversight by Naval Reactors was a factor in the refusals. Rickover also updates the Joint Committee on the construction of the NR-1 research vessel. In his 1968 testimony, Rickover provides the Joint Committee with an update on propulsion for guided missile cruisers, including a detailed history of the lengthy battles between Congress and the Department of Defense (under Robert McNamara) on nuclear propulsion for surface ships. 
 Source:  http://collections.stanford.edu/atomicenergy/bin/search/advanced/process?clauseMapped%28catKey%29=5459632&sort=title 
 Date:   1968 
 Subject(s):  Rickover, Hyman G. | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program--1969 Add
 Summary:  This Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearing was held to obtain supplemental data for the fiscal year 1970 Atomic Energy Commission request for the naval reactors development program. The document includes information on several issues of controversy between the Joint Committee and the Executive Branch, including the ongoing construction of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, the development of a high speed fast attack submarine (Los Angeles-class), and Admiral Rickover's continuation as the head of the Naval Reactors program. It includes a lengthy (101 pages) record of Admiral Rickover's testimony to the Joint Committee. Rickover's testimony focuses on the danger on the Soviet Union's submarine buildup and the need to build the high speed, fast attack submarine; this construction program was a point of contention between the Joint Committee and both the Johnson and Nixon administrations. The Joint Committee's position in the document: "Because of the urgency of delivering these new ships to the fleet, the Joint Committee strongly recommends that the fiscal year 1970 nuclear warship construction program include as a minimum the funds necessary to award contracts for the first three high-speed submarines and advance funding for five more" (VII). Also, given the lengthy battle between the Joint Committee and the Department of Defense over the application of nuclear power to aircraft carriers (with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara recommending the construction of a conventional carrier in 1963), Rickover's description of systems analysis in his testimony (on pages 63-65) is both interesting and revealing. 
 Source:  http://collections.stanford.edu/atomicenergy/bin/search/advanced/process?clauseMapped%28catKey%29=5461012&sort=title 
 Date:   1969 
 Subject(s):  S6G | USS Los Angeles (SSN-688) | Rickover, Hyman G. | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program--1970 Add
 Summary:  The unclassified portion of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearings relating to the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. The document describes the growth in the Soviet submarine force, including ballistic missile submarines. A key recommendation concerns the construction of a new class of fast attack submarines, the Los Angeles class: "Because of the urgency of delivering the new high-speed SSN 688 class attack submarines to the fleet, the Joint Committee strongly recommends that the fiscal year 1971 nuclear warship construction program include as a minimum the funds necessary to award contracts for four of these submarines and advance funding for three more" (vii). Additionally, David Leighton of Naval Reactors describes the limits on construction activities because the Department of Defense had not placed "the highest industrial priority" on the high-speed submarine project (30). One noted engineering advance is core life extension: "Cores are being produced which will provide for over 10 years of normal ship operations without refueling, a remarkable advancement over the 2- to 3-year lifetimes of our earliest naval cores" (iii). Rickover also describes another technical development, the electric drive submarine, which he asserts "is being designed to be the quietest submarine that has ever been built" (40). He describes the technological advances required for the Nimitz-class carriers, which are powered by two A4W reactors. (At the time of the hearing, the USS Nimitz was under construction.) 
 Source:  http://collections.stanford.edu/atomicenergy/bin/search/advanced/process?clauseMapped%28catKey%29=5461013&sort=title 
 Date:   1970 
 Subject(s):  Rickover, Hyman G. | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program--1971 Add
 Summary:  This document includes the unclassified testimony of Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Rickover's testimony touches on a wide range of topics, particularly the need to expand the nuclear navy in light the growth of the Soviet fleet. Rickover emphasizes "the rapidly expanding Soviet naval threat and the rapidly declining naval strength of the United States relative to the threat" and the Soviet's quantitative and qualitative advances in submarine development (iii). As one step to address these advances, the Joint Committee advocates "a strong construction program of high speed SSN-688 (Los Angeles-class) class ships" (viii). Rickover asserts that "because of their improved propulsion plant, [Los Angeles-class] submarines will have greatly increased capabilities compared to our previous attack submarine designs" (14). The Joint Committee's primary criticism of the Nixon administration and the Department of Defense is in the area of surface ship nuclear construction, particularly the administration's decision to delay approval for the acquisition of "long lead nuclear propulsion plant components" for the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) (xi). In his testimony, Rickover describes the impact of this delay in CVN-70 funding and delivery delays in two other nuclear-powered carriers also being built by Newport News Shipbuilding (the Nimitz and the Eisenhower). The Forward also describes the committee's support for nuclear-powered carrier escort ships. Finally, in describing nuclear propulsion plant development, Rickover emphasizes the importance of "engineering innovation" over radical breakthroughs to achieve more powerful and lighter plants (35). 
 Source:  http://collections.stanford.edu/atomicenergy/bin/search/advanced/process?clauseMapped%28catKey%29=5461032&sort=title 
 Date:   1971 
 Subject(s):  Rickover, Hyman G. | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program--1972-73 Add
 Summary:  This document is the unclassified record of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearings held on February 8, 1972 and March 28, 1973. During the 1972 hearing, Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover describes the current size of the United States' nuclear-powered submarine fleet: "We have a total today of 118 atomic submarines authorized of which 97 are presently operational. Among those that are operational, 41 are fleet ballistic missile submarines, 56 are attack submarines. We have a total of 21 more nuclear attack submarines under construction" (3). Both members of the Joint Committee and Rickover express concern over the quantitative advances in the Soviet Union's submarine fleet. This hearing includes a lengthy discussion on personnel selection and retention issues for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. Rickover also advocates for committee support for the funding the fourth nuclear-powered carrier and for the construction of nuclear-powered carrier escorts. In the 1973 hearing, Rickover again expresses his concern over the rapid growth of the Soviet submarine force, noting that the qualitative advantage of U.S. submarines would be decisive "only so long as the quantitative advantage of the opposing force remains within reasonable bounds" (148). He also describes the Polaris submarine replacement program, Trident, the cost of which clearly concern committee members. He emphasizes that the reactor plant costs for the first submarine ("$56 million") were a relatively small part of the total unit cost (168). At this point in time, "long leadtime propulsion plant components for the lead ship and three follow ships [were] on order." (196). Additionally, construction on the Trident (S8G) prototype had started. Admiral Rickover noted the importance of prototype design and construction: "The Trident submarine is planned to follow the approach that has been used successfully to design, build, and deploy our nuclear submarines since the Nautilus. The prototype propulsion plant is being built using the same time phasing as the Nautilus prototype and ship" (198). Finally, Rickover also provides the committee with an update on the high-speed, SSN-688 (Los Angeles-class) submarine. By 1973, twelve Los Angeles-class submarines were under construction. 
 Source:  http://collections.stanford.edu/atomicenergy/bin/search/advanced/process?clauseMapped%28catKey%29=5461010&sort=title 
 Date:   1974 
 Subject(s):  Rickover, Hyman G. | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program--1974 Add
 Summary:  This Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearing document includes extensive testimony by Admiral Hyman Rickover, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion. Rickover opens by praising several committee members who chose not to stand for reelection in 1974. He reviews the names of committee members who have either died or left Congress - indeed, the Joint Committee was abolished within three years and the changes in Congress made Rickover's 1982 retirement much easier to accomplish. During the hearing, Rickover describes the efforts of Naval Reactors and industry to develop longer life cores for nuclear submarines and surface ships (10 to 13 years at the time of the hearing), including the path to cores that will last the life of the ship and cost issues. These included the higher research costs and the eventual savings obtained through reduced overhaul intervals and increased ship availability. Rickover also describes procurement for SSN-688 (Los Angeles-class) fast attack submarines. (The USS Los Angeles was launched earlier in 1974.) Rickover notes that "funds have been appropriated for 23 of these high-speed submarines, with advanced procurement funds for five more" (4). Finally, the 1973 naval nuclear propulsion (ships and support facilities) environmental monitoring report is included in the document. 
 Source:  http://collections.stanford.edu/atomicenergy/bin/search/advanced/process?clauseMapped%28catKey%29=5460466&sort=title 
 Date:   1975 
 Subject(s):  Rickover, Hyman G. | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program--1975 Add
 Summary:  This document is the unclassified version of Admiral Hyman Rickover's March 5, 1975 testimony to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. This hearing occurred during a time of transition, as the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) had replaced the Atomic Energy Commission and was now the civilian parent of Rickover's Naval Reactors organization. Rickover reports to the committee on the recent, successful sea trials of the USS Nimitz, the second nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. He also reports on the operation and construction of SSN-688 (Los Angeles) class high-speed fast attack submarines. This hearing record provides a great deal of information on the Light Water Breeder Reactor (LWBR). Rickover describes its basic design: "We are now working on a breeder core to go into the existing Shippingport plant as a backfit. This breeder core will use light water instead of sodium as coolant." Continuing: "This breeder core will use the thorium/uranium-233 fuel cycle" (21). The LWBR enabled Naval Reactors to install the breeder core into the existing Shippingport reactor vessel and to leverage its experience with water-cooled plants in investigating breeding. During this testimony, Rickover and David Leighton of Naval Reactors contrast the LWBR design with liquid metal breeder reactors, including the significantly lower design costs of the LWBR and the greater breeding potential of the liquid metal design. Appendix 2 is a detailed report on the design, goals, and breeding process for the LWBR. 
 Source:  http://collections.stanford.edu/atomicenergy/bin/search/advanced/process?clauseMapped%28catKey%29=5461005&sort=title 
 Date:   1975 
 Subject(s):  Light Water Breeder Reactor (LWBR) | Rickover, Hyman G. | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program--1976 Add
 Summary:  This document is the unclassified record of hearings on the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program held in March 1976. Admiral Hyman Rickover, Director, Division of Naval Reactors, testified on the Naval Reactors Program and the Light Water Breeder Reactor (LWBR). After summarizing the program's growth (106 submarines in operation, with an additional 32 Los Angeles-class and Trident submarines authorized; and, two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in operation), Rickover describes the rapid growth of the Soviet submarine fleet and the United States' responses of the high-speed, fast attack (SSN-688) class and the Trident ballistic missile submarine to replace Polaris and Poseidon ballistic missile submarines. Some committee members, led by Stuart Symington, express concerns about the high cost of the Trident submarine program. In a statement, Rickover notes the advances provided by Trident in terms of ballistic missile range (permitting submarines to be based closer to the United States) and noise reduction, terming the Trident program as "vital to our national survival" (37). Rickover also includes a defense of nuclear-powered escort vessels in his statement: "Just as I recommended that new aircraft carriers be nuclear powered, so do I recommend that new guided-missile major combatants built to accompany them be nuclear powered" (41). He also compares nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers (CSGNs) with DDG-47 (the USS Ticonderoga), which used gas turbine propulsion, the system that eventually supplanted nuclear propulsion for carrier group escort destroyers and cruisers. A lengthy 1975 environmental monitoring report for the Naval Reactors program (including nuclear-powered ships and support facilities) is included as an appendix. 
 Source:  http://collections.stanford.edu/atomicenergy/bin/search/advanced/process?clauseMapped%28catKey%29=2528106&sort=title 
 Date:   1976 
 Subject(s):  Rickover, Hyman G. | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Naval reactor program and Polaris missile system Add
 Summary:  This document is the public record of a Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearing on the Polaris missile submarine program. The hearing was conducted on board the USS George Washington, the first ballistic missile submarine, which was powered by the already-proven S5W reactor. The record describes the integration of nuclear propulsion technology, proven in earlier submarines such as the Nautilus, and ballistic missile technology, under the oversight of Admiral William F. Raborn. Its introduction describes the Joint Committee's focus on reactor safety, mentioning the 1961 SL-1 accident at the Idaho National Laboratory and the importance of the design, construction, and operation standards created by Naval Reactors: "The committee also looks to the Navy to meet the Atomic Energy Commission's safety standards in all aspects of its nuclear propulsion program and to resist any pressures to force this new technology into an old system which may have sufficed for ordinary propulsion" (VI). In his testimony, Admiral Hyman Rickover (Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion) notes that the first three Polaris subs were originally designed as attack submarines and converted to ballistic missile submarines. (All of these submarines were powered by the S5W reactor plant.) Rickover describes the unique aspects of the Naval Reactors program (for example, its close collaboration with Atomic Energy Commission laboratories and land prototypes in plant testing). The document includes correspondence between the Navy, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the AEC's Safeguards Committee, and the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The Joint Committee's ongoing and strong support of Admiral Rickover and the Naval Reactors program is reflected in an opening letter from its chair and ranking member to the Secretary of the Navy (pages 10 and 11 of the hearing document). 
 Source:  http://tinyurl.com/cj5c652 
 Date:  09 April 1960 
 Subject(s):  S5W | Reactor safety | Rickover, Hyman G. | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Naval reactor program and Shippingport project Add
 Summary:  This Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearing record includes lengthy testimony by Admiral Hyman Rickover, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, on a range of issues, including the Shippingport Atomic Power Station, the first nuclear power plant that supplied commercial power on a large scale. Rep. Melvin Price, chair of the Subcommittee on Research and Development, opens the hearing by praising Rickover and Naval Reactors: "The [Joint Committee] has been very favorably impressed by the excellent contributions the AEC has made to the civilian power program through the naval reactors program" (1). The hearing includes Rickover's update on naval nuclear propulsion. He describes some of the problems with the Seawolf's sodium-cooled reactor plant, and Naval Reactors' reactor development philosophy (with parallel development of thermal energy/pressurized water and intermediate range/sodium-cooled reactor plants). He also describes some of the other challenges faced by the program at its beginning, such as the need to support the development of a Zirconium industry to support naval nuclear propulsion. Regarding training generally and prototype training (which continues today) specifically, Rickover asserts that in the S1W prototype, "we have no better training facility in the Navy than we have there and it is absolutely essential for the future of nuclear power in the Navy that we train the people there, on a real plant, a live one, because we do not want any accidents to happen" [on nuclear-powered vessels in the fleet] (5). During the hearing, Admiral Rickover provides committee members with information on the PWR (Shippingport's pressurized water reactor plant). He notes that Naval Reactors' approach with the Shippingport plant is similar to that used with earlier submarine reactors and propulsion plants: "The Naval Reactors Branch approves the details of the design. We keep in constant touch with what the reactor designers, the machinery designers, the shipbuilders, and the construction contractors are doing" (26). Also, the document includes the testimony of John Simpson, the manager of the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, Westinghouse; he provides information on Bettis' support for both submarine plants and the Shippingport plant. In summary, the hearing describes how Naval Reactors supported the design and development of the civilian Shippingport plan and the common threads between Shippingport and the successful submarine reactor program. Clearly, a point of interest for committee members is the cost of design, development, and construction for the Shippingport plant, because of their interest in a successful commercial nuclear power industry in the United States. 
 Source:  http://collections.stanford.edu/atomicenergy/bin/search/advanced/process?clauseMapped%28catKey%29=3163463&sort=title 
 Date:   1957 
 Subject(s):  Shippingport Atomic Power Station | Rickover, Hyman G. | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Naval Reactors Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory Add
 Summary:  An aerial view of the Naval Reactors Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory. NRF was the site of the S1W, A1W, and S5G prototypes. The site's Expended Core Facility remains open to support the processing of spent fuel from United States naval reactors. 
 Source:  http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=45325547583 
 Date:   unknown  
 Subject(s):  S1W | A1W | S5G | Expended Core Facility | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Image 
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 Title:  Naval reactors physics handbook. Volume 1, Selected basic techniques Add
 Chapter title:  "Reactor physics and its application to nuclear power reactors" 
 Summary:  This chapter, written by physicist Alvin Radkowsky, summarizes the design challenges of submarine reactors in comparison with the natural uranium graphite reactors that had been designed and built during World War II. For example, Radkowsky describes the novelty ("close spacing") and design complexity of the control rod arrangement in PWRs (4). He also describes the parallel track of reactor development overseen by NR, with the intermediate range research supporting the S1G and S2G reactors performed by the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory; and, research supporting the Submarine Thermal Reactor (STR, or the S1W and S2W reactors) led by the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory. He notes that while the intermediate range reactor approach had, by 1964, been abandoned in favor of the pressurized water reactor (PWR) design, that "fuel loading densities are often sufficiently high [so] that a substantial fraction of the fissions occurs above thermal neutron energies" (2). As a result, some research relating to the intermediate range reactor could be applied to the design of PWRs. Radkowsky also summarizes some design contrasts between submarine reactors and the reactors for the Shippingport Atomic Power Station, with the latter relying on fuels with high U-238 composition. 
 Source:  http://www.osti.gov/bridge 
 Date:   1964 
 Subject(s):  Reactor physics | Nuclear engineering | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Naval Reactors Prime Contractor Team (NRPCT) Experiences and considerations with irradiation test performance in an international environment Add
 Summary:  This document describes the NRPCT's efforts to identify reactors worldwide for irradiation testing of materials expected to be included in a Prometheus reactor. The Experimental Fast Reactor JOYO in O-arai, Japan was identified as the best facility to support irradiation testing for the project (which was created to support space reactor development for solar exploration; the project ended in 2005). JOYO is a sodium-cooled Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR). Detailed planning information for reactor materials irradiation testing is included in the report. 
 Source:  http://www.osti.gov/bridge/purl.cover.jsp?purl=/883694-B0koQW/ 
 Date:  15 February 2006 
 Subject(s):  Project Prometheus | Nuclear engineering | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Naval spent nuclear fuel management Add
 Summary:  This document provides a planning and options overview of spent fuel handling for naval reactors plants as of 1994. Attachment A provides, as noted in the scope statement, "an evaluation of the radiological and non-radiological risks associated with the transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and [irradiated] test specimens that originate from Navy and commercial shipyards, prototypes, and related Department of Energy laboratories" (A-1). These materials have historically been handled at the Idaho National Laboratory's Expended Core Facility. It continues by describing five alternatives for the handling and management of spent fuel generated from naval nuclear propulsion plants. This section also describes, in depth, the locations that send and receive shipments; spent nuclear fuel shipping containers; transport methods for containers; and, information on potential exposure from the transportation of spent fuel containers. On the latter point, information on accident analyses (along with exposure as the result of incident-free transport) is included. Attachment B provides in-depth information on spent fuel handling activities at the Expended Core Facility. Attachment C has information on the storage of spent fuels in water pools in comparison with dry containers. It notes that "water pools have historically been the method of choice for interim storage and fuel handling because: (1) water has a high thermal capacity for the removal of heat from the fuel, (2) the transparency of water facilitates the inspection and movement of the fuel, (3) water is an excellent gamma and neutron shield, (4) water is easy to purify and recycle, and (5) water provides a means to prevent release of radioactive material into the air" (C-1). Attachment D describes the storage of spent fuel at naval shipyards and prototypes, after its removal from naval reactors. Attachment E fleshes out the fuel handling and storage alternatives by "describ[ing] the options for establishing new or modified facilities that essentially duplicate the capabilities of the existing Expended Core Facility (ECF)" (E-1). Finally, attachment F provides "estimated environmental consequences, event probabilities, and risk (a product of probability and consequence) for both normal operations and postulated accident scenarios related to the storage and examination of naval spent nuclear fuel" (F-1). Current plans call for the recapitalization of the Expended Core Facility through the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project, through the construction of a new facility at the Idaho National Laboratory or by overhauling the existing facility. 
 Source:  http://www.osti.gov/bridge 
 Date:   1994 
 Subject(s):  Expended Core Facility | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
 Format:  PDF 
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 Title:  Navy aircraft carriers: Cost-effectiveness of conventionally and nuclear-powered carriers Add
 Summary:  This 1998 GAO study analyzes the cost-effectiveness of nuclear-powered carriers compared with their conventional counterparts. Chapter 3 focuses on a primary finding, that .life-cycle costs for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are greater than for conventionally-powered carriers. (74). This includes construction and modernization costs; support and operations costs; and, costs after decommissioning (.because of the extensive work necessary to remove spent nuclear fuel from the reactor plant and remove and dispose of the radiologically contaminated reactor plant and other system components. (74). The report notes that the Department of Defense .disagreed that comparing the life-cycle costs of conventionally powered carriers such as the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy with Nimitz-class nuclear-powered carriers was appropriate because of differences in the age, size, and capabilities of the carriers. (96). Chapter 4 describes the benefits of having a United States carrier homeported in Japan and the maintenance facility support that would be required to support a nuclear-powered carrier to be based there. (Note that the USS George Washington, CVN-73, has been based in Yokosuka, Japan since 2008.) Overall, the study provides a good analysis of the costs and benefits associated with naval nuclear propulsion for the carrier fleet. The last conventionally-powered carrier, the USS Kitty Hawk, was decommissioned in 2009; as of today, all United States Navy carriers are nuclear-powered. This study was published at a time when the best path for propulsion systems was being carefully analyzed. The chart on page 23 that compares the specifications of the USS John F. Kennedy (conventional) versus the USS Nimitz (nuclear) has several critical data items. In terms of aviation fuel capacity and ordnance capacity, the nuclear-powered carrier is vastly superior. In other ways not listed, such as sustained speed and the elimination of stack gases, the nuclear-powered carrier is again superior. 
 Source:  http://www.fdsys.gov/ 
 Date:   1998 
 Subject(s):  Budgetary information | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Navy nuclear-powered surface ships: Background, issues, and options for Congress Add
 Summary:  This 2010 study, authored by Ronald O'Rourke of the Congressional Research Service, describes issues relating to the expansion of nuclear propulsion to cruisers. O'Rourke notes that the only current United States Navy nuclear-powered surface ships are aircraft carriers. At the same time, section 1012 of the 2008 Defense Authorization Act states that major combantant ships should be nuclear-powered, unless the Secretary of Defense reports to Congress that the use of nuclear propulsion is not in the national interest. The author describes issues relating to the CG(X) cruiser class (which was cancelled in 2010) and provides cost comparisons of nuclear- versus conventionally-powered cruisers. 
 Source:  http://opencrs.com/document/RL33946/ 
 Date:  29 September 2010 
 Subject(s):  CG(X) | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Navy Ohio replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine program: Background and issues for Congress Add
 Summary:  This report, written by naval affairs specialist Ronald O'Rourke, describes the Ohio ballistic missile submarine replacement (ORP) or SSBN(X) program. The report's table 1, on page 5, shows how SSBN(X) fits with the four predecessor classes of U.S. ballistic missile submarines. O'Rourke notes that "unlike the [S8G] Ohio-class design, which requires a mid-life nuclear refueling, the SSBN(X) is to be equipped with a life-of-the-ship nuclear fuel core (a nuclear fuel core that is sufficient to power the ship for its entire expected service life" (11). Additionally, to achieve noise reduction, "the SSBN(X) is to be equipped with an electric-drive propulsion plant, as opposed to the mechanical-drive propulsion plant used on other Navy submarines" (15). O'Rourke's report provides information on issues that will have to be considered by Congress for the SSBN(X) program, such as the number of SLBMs in each submarine. This section quotes Admiral Kirkland Donald, Naval Reactors head in support of the decision to reduce the number of missile tubes in the SSBN(X) from 20 to 16 as a cost savings measure, "because what that allowed us to do was to down rate...the propulsion power that was needed" for the smaller submarine (17). 
 Source:  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf 
 Date:  05 April 2012 
 Subject(s):  SSBN(X) | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Navy Ohio replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine program: Background and issues for Congress Add
 Summary:  This report, written by naval affairs specialist Ronald O'Rourke, describes the Ohio ballistic missile submarine replacement (ORP) or SSBN(X) program. The goal of this program is "to design and build a new class of 12 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace the Navy's current force of 14 Ohio class SSBNs." In the summary, he cites the September 2013 congressional testimony of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, who described the SSBN(X) as "the top priority program for the Navy." The first SSBN(X) submarine is expected to be procured in FY 2021. One issue outlined by O'Rourke is the impact of sequester funding cuts on the SSBN(X) program. In May 2013, the Navy noted that the March 2013 sequester cuts "have not altered the Navy's plan to procure the lead boat in FY2021, but have added schedule and technical risk to the program" (17). A late 2013 or early 2014 sequester cut, on top of the 2013 reductions, would have a damaging impact on the SSBN(X) program and on the nation's strategic defense posture, "delay[ing] the planned start of construction on the first SSBN(X) from FY 2021 to FY 2022. This would cause us to be unable to meet U.S. Strategic Command presence requirements when the Ohio-class SSBN retires..." (18). O'Rourke lists the procurement estimates for the SSBN(X): 12 billion for the lead boat in the class (2013 dollars) and an "average procurement cost of boats 2 through 12 in the Ohio replacement program at about $5.4 billion each in FY2010 dollars." However, he describes the variables that could impact SSBN(X) costs, including the construction level for Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines: "If shipbuilding affordability pressures result in Virginia-class boats being removed from the 30-year shipbuilding plan during the years of SSBN(X) procurement, the resulting reduction in submarine production economies of scale could make SSBN(X)s more expensive to build than the Navy estimates" (20). 
 Source:  www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf 
 Date:  22 October 2013 
 Subject(s):  SSBN(X) | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Navy response to Freedom of Information Act request following fire on board USS Miami Add
 Summary:  This document is the U.S. Navy's response to a Freedom of Information Act request placed by WCSH 6, a Portland, Maine NBC affiliate television station. The request was placed as part of the station's investigative reporting following a May 2012 fire on board the USS Miami, an attack submarine that was undergoing an Engineering Overhaul (EOH) at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard at the time of the fire. The response document includes information on the scope of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program and the current size of the Navy's nuclear fleet. It also provides a high-level description of pressurized water reactors and the barriers in place to prevent the release of radioactivity from nuclear-powered submarines and ships. Two sections at the conclusion of the document address fires on board nuclear-powered warships. 
 Source:  http://www.wcsh6.com/assetpool/documents/130522055829_NavyResponse.pdf 
 Date:   2013 
 Subject(s):  USS Miami (SSN-755) | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Navy ship propulsion technologies: Options for reducing oil use - Background for Congress Add
 Summary:  This Congressional Research Service study, written by Ronald O'Rourke, describes a range of strategies for reducing the consumption of oil on naval vessels, including the expansion of nuclear propulsion in the surface fleet. O'Rourke analyzes the past use of nuclear propulsion for CGNs, all of which had been decommissioned by the time he wrote this report. The nuclear-powered, guided missile cruiser analysis is relevant to the then-planned CG(X)-class of cruisers. The CG(X) program was cancelled in 2010. 
 Source:  http://opencrs.com/document/RL33360/2006-07-26/ 
 Date:  11 December 2006 
 Subject(s):  CG(X) | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Navy SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarine program: Background and issues for Congress Add
 Summary:  This Congressional Research Service report, written by naval affairs specialist Ronald O'Rourke, focuses on cost issues for the United States Navy's next-generation of ballistic missile submarines, the SSBN(X). Current plans call for the design and construction of twelve SSBN(X) submarines, with the first to be procured in FY 2019. The SSBN(X) is the replacement class for Ohio-class Trident ballistic missile submarines. The report identifies oversight issues for Congress. Given the expected costs of the SSBN(X) submarines, O'Rourke emphasizes that "decisions that Congress makes on the SSBN(X) program could substantially affect U.S. military capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base" (1). In terms of the reactor plant, the report notes that SSBN(X) boats will have an installed core capable of powering the submarine for its entire expected service life of 40 years. Thus, no mid-life refueling (performed for Ohio-class submarines) will be required. O'Rourke also describes options for SSBN(X) construction, given the fact that only two shipyards in the United States are currently qualified to build nuclear submarines: General Dynamics/Electric Boat (GN/EB) and Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS). Note 64 (23-24) provides information on the shared construction arrangement between the two yards for Virginia-class submarines, along with the costs and benefits of this joint arrangement 
 Source:  http://opencrs.com/document/R41129/ 
 Date:  22 April 2011 
 Subject(s):  SSBN(X) | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Navy Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarine procurement: Background and issues for Congress Add
 Summary:  This Congressional Research Service report, authored by naval affairs specialist Ronald O'Rourke, describes procurement issues relating to Virginia-class attack submarines. O'Rourke describes the joint production arrangement for the Virginia class: "GD/EB builds certain parts of each boat, Newport News builds certain other parts of each boat, and the yards take turns building the reactor compartments and performing final assembly of the boats" (4). One crucial benefit of this arrangement, in the two U.S. shipyards currently qualified to build nuclear submarines, is that it "preserves both yards' ability to build submarine reactor compartments (a key capability for a submarine-construction yard) and perform submarine final-assembly work" (4). The joint arrangement is in the context of the Virginia-class program, in which submarines are "being procured at a relatively low annual rate" of 1-2 boats per year (4). The author also describes a projected shortfall in available U.S. attack submarines (the number of available submarines is expected to dip to a low of 39 in 2030) and some steps that could mitigate this shortfall, including reducing the length of shipyard construction time for Virginia-class boats from 72 to 60 months. 
 Source:  http://opencrs.com/document/RL32418/ 
 Date:   2010 
 Subject(s):  S9G | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Notice of intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the recapitalization of infrastructure supporting naval spent nuclear fuel handling and examination at the Idaho National Laboratory Add
 Summary:  As noted in the summary section, "the [Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program] intends to prepare an [Environmental Impact Statement] for the recapitalization of infrastructure at the Expended Core Facility (ECF) at the [Idaho National Laboratory] in Idaho" (1). The supplementary information section nicely summarizes Naval Reactors' cradle-to-grave responsibility for nuclear propulsion and the role of the Expended Core Facility in "support[ing] the design and maintenance of nuclear propulsion systems by providing for the examination of spent nuclear fuel and irradiated materials" (2). The ECF works "to provide data on current reactor performance, to validate models used to predict future performance, and to support research to improve reactor design" (2). The notice describes the fact that "a significant portion of the ECF infrastructure has been in service for over 50 years" (3). The planned recapitalization work is intended to extend ECF's ability to support naval nuclear propulsion spent fuel activities for another 40 years. 
 Source:  http://www.ecfrecapitalization.us/ 
 Date:  19 July 2010 
 Subject(s):  Expended Core Facility | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  NR-1 control and instrument panels Add
 Summary:  Interior of NR-1, showing the submarine's instrument and control panels. NR-1 was powered by a small, low-power pressurized water reactor. The submarine was capable of speeds of 3.5 knots per hour when submerged, and had forward and aft wheels, enabling her to work on the ocean floor. 
 Source:  http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/08547.htm 
 Date:   unknown  
 Subject(s):  NR-1 | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Image 
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 Title:  The NR-1 research vessel Add
 Summary:  The NR-1 nuclear submarine at Port Canaveral, Florida. NR-1 was a small, deep-diving submarine that was designed to operate on the ocean floor.The submarine's low-power reactor was designed by General Electric and could be operated by a single crewman. 
 Source:  http://www.navsource.org/archives/08/08547.htm 
 Reference:  Vyborny, Lee, and Don Davis. Dark Waters: An Insider's Account of the NR-1, the Cold War's Undercover Nuclear Sub. New York: New American Library, 2003, pages 53-54. 
 Date:  01 February 2006 
 Subject(s):  NR-1 | Naval Reactors 
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 Title:  Nuclear analysis and performance of the Light Water Breeder Reator (LWBR) core power operations at Shippingport (LWBR Development Program) Add
 Summary:  This report, written by H.C. Hecker, analyzes the performance of the thorium oxide-uranium oxide Light Water Breeder Reactor (LWBR) core that was used in the Shippingport Atomic Power Station from 1977 to 1982. During this period, the Shippingport plant generated 1.7 billion net kilowatt hours of energy to the Duquesne Light Energy utility. Heckert notes that the core's design Effective Full Power Hours output of 18,000 was exceeded in the first three years of operation (at 18,298 EFPH). At this point, limits on reactor power and primary plant pressure and temperature were adopted to extend core life. The unique LWBR design, in which reactivity was controlled through the use of movable fuel assemblies instead of hafnium control rods, is noted by the author. In 1982, "the end of reactivity lifetime at a maximum power level of 80% was reached at about 27,100 EFPH with the 12 movable seed assemblies at the maximum withdrawn position" (3). Hecker also describes the core's breeding efficiency: "Fuel depletion calculations which approximated the actual power operations indicate that more fissile fuel was produced in the core than was consumed. The calculated final fissile fuel content is 1.3 percent greater than the initial fissile fuel inventory" (4). Both the core materials and reactivity control systems were "designed to minimize parasitic neutron losses," thus supporting the breeding process (5). The report includes a description and diagrams of the LWBR's core design, which used the seed-blanket arrangement employed in the original Shippingport core. Historian Francis Duncan describes the time commitments that Admiral Hyman Rickover and the Naval Reactors organization made to the development of a civilian nuclear power industry in the United States, through its technical oversight of the design, construction, and operation of the Shippingport Atomic Power Station and later that of the Light Water Breeder Reactor core. The LWBR was installed in the existing Shippingport reactor pressure vessel and demonstrated breeding in a pressurized water reactor plant. 
 Source:  http://www.osti.gov/bridge 
 Reference:  Duncan, Francis. Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1990, pages 190-231. 
 Date:   1984 
 Subject(s):  Light Water Breeder Reactor (LWBR) | Shippingport Atomic Power Station | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Nuclear navy, 1946-1962 Add
 Summary:  The foundational history of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, covering the period of the program's creation, under the leadership of Hyman G. Rickover, to 1962, by which time the United States Navy's fleet included nuclear-powered attack submarines, ballistic missile submarines, and surface ships. The program's leadership in support of the Shippingport Atomic Power Station is also chronicled. 
 Source:  http://energy.gov/management/downloads/hewlett-and-duncan-nuclear-navy-1946-1962 
 Date:   1974 
 Subject(s):  Naval Reactors | Rickover, Hyman G. | S1W | USS Nautilus (SSN-571) | S1G | USS Seawolf (SSN-575) 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Nuclear Power Training Unit, Charleston Add
 Summary:  The Nuclear Power Training Unit facility located at the Naval Weapons Station in Charleston, South Carolina. Graduates of Naval Nuclear Power School are assigned to qualify at a prototype plant in Charleston and in Ballston Spa, New York. The two prototypes at NPTU Charleston are moored submarines, both of which have S5W reactor plants. 
 Source:  http://www.oocities.org/matt_sutphen/nptu.htm 
 Date:   unknown  
 Subject(s):  S5W | USS Daniel Webster (MTS-626) | USS Sam Rayburn (MTS-635) | Naval Reactors 
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 Title:  Nuclear propulsion for naval surface vessels Add
 Summary:  This Joint Committee on Atomic Energy document, published in 1964, is centered on Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara's 1963 decision to make CV-67 (later commissioned as the USS John F. Kennedy) a conventionally-powered, oil-fired carrier. As committee chairman Sen. John Pastore notes in the hearing, one critical point of concern is the degree to which this decision represented a policy statement by the Defense Department on nuclear propulsion for surface ships generally and aircraft carriers specifically. Also, during the testimony of Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth, Pastore and other committee members express frustration over Korth's inability to cite any Defense Department officials opposed to making the CV-67 nuclear-powered (even though Korth testifies that both he and Chief of Naval Operations David McDonald supported nuclear propulsion for the carrier). During the hearing, Pastore also cites the Joint Committee's leadership on atomic power (including the development of the hydrogen bomb and the construction of the USS Nautilus, the world's first nuclear-powered submarine). Pastore notes that McNamara's decision on CV-67 was counter to the committee's wishes. As Chet Holifield notes during the hearing, this decision makes it difficult for the Joint Committee to continue to fund research on naval reactors applications. Dr. Harold Brown (later Secretary of Defense under President Carter) testifies in support of McNamara's decision. The advantages of nuclear propulsion for aircraft carriers, as demonstrated in the USS Enterprise, are central to the dispute over CV-67. Brown asserts that "nuclear propulsion may provide a means of achieving a major increase in the combat capabilities of surface warships, as it has done in the case of submarines, but it is not certain at this time that such will be the case." In contrast, Korth, McDonald, and Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover of Naval Reactors all testify in support of CV-67 being built as a nuclear-powered carrier because of the capabilities demonstrated by the Enterprise following its commissioning in November 1961. During the hearing, Admiral Rickover testifies on reactor development, noting that a four reactor carrier could be installed in the CV-67 that would generate the same power as the Enterprise's eight reactors. This would reduce operating personnel costs relative to the Enterprise's eight A2W reactors. Additionally, the time between refueling would be lengthened for the four reactor carrier, compared with the Enterprise's reactor plants. In one sense, the Joint Committee's resistance to McNamara's ruling on CV-67 did have a long-term effect, in that the John F. Kennedy was the final oil-fired aircraft carrier to be appropriated and constructed. 
 Source:  http://collections.stanford.edu/atomicenergy/bin/detail?fileID=1228277303 
 Date:   1964 
 Subject(s):  Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Nuclear propulsion for naval warships Add
 Summary:  This document is a hearing and inquiry record of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy's Subcommittee on Military Applications regarding the application of nuclear propulsion to naval warships. The primary issue of concern to the Joint Committee is the slow adoption of naval nuclear propulsion, a point of contention between the committee and the Department of Defense for more than a decade (under three administrations). The programs and vessels that the Joint Committee was most concerned about in 1972 included the high-speed fast attack submarine (Los Angeles-class); the need for more Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers; the Trident ballistic missile submarine; and, the construction of more nuclear-powered frigates (carrier escort vessels). Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover, who led the Naval Reactors program at the time, testifies at his hearing in strong support of all of these programs. He describes the benefits of the Trident missile submarine, including longer-range missiles, which would make anti-submarine operations by the Soviet Union much more difficult when compared with Polaris submarines. Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt describes the Department of Defense's position on nuclear propulsion: "The value of nuclear propulsion is unquestionable. The Navy has stated and will continue to positively state its requirements for nuclear propelled ships to provide strategic flexibility. However, fiscal feasibility and the need for balance in numbers and types of weapons systems in the face of a powerful and diversified Soviet naval capability will continue to be the governing factors in formulating our nuclear programs" (38). Assistant Secretary of Defense David Packard provides additional information on the Department of Defense's position in written testimony and responses to Joint Committee questions. The committee's questions on funding for CVN-70 (later named the USS Carl Vinson) emphasize the long-term contention between it and the executive branch over nuclear-powered carrier construction. One of the questions notes that the expected costs for CVN-70 would increase by more than $125 million if advanced procurement funds were delayed, "due to the disruption which would occur to the special nuclear propulsion plant component production lines established from the Nimitz class carriers," following the construction of the USS Nimitz and the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower. Packard accepts the estimate's accuracy, but adds that he cannot support the CVN-70 until certain criteria are met, noting that "when I am satisfied that the Navy has an adequate program to provide the weapons, both offensive and defensive, and the operational doctrine needed to meet the threat environment of the decade of the 1980's, I would consider approving the CVAN-70" (102). 
 Source:  http://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/3162437 
 Date:   1972 
 Subject(s):  Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program meeting on Spent Naval Fuel (SNF) Add
 Summary:  This report includes a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for Acceptance of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) between the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) and the Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. The agreement "establishes the terms and conditions under which [Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management] will make available disposal services to NNPP for naval SNF" (3). More specifically, it was designed to "achieve safe and timely disposal of naval SNF by identifying data needs, interfaces and acceptance criteria and developing compliance procedures needed to support the acceptance of naval SNF" by the Department of Energy. 
 Source:  http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0331/ML033180083.pdf 
 Date:  10 December 1998 
 Subject(s):  Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Nuclear submarines: Navy efforts to reduce inactivation costs Add
 Summary:  This 1992 General Accounting Office report analyzed the Navy's nuclear submarine deactivation program. One significant cost-reduction option, which has been put into practice, is the centralization of submarine deactivation and disposal work at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS). Major steps in the deactivation process include the defueling of each sub's nuclear reactor(s) and the removal of the reactor compartment for storage at the Hanford Site. As noted in the report, the "GAO's analysis shows that inactivations cost considerably less at [PSNS] that at other [nuclear-qualified] shipyards" (4). One factor in this savings is the fact that PSNS performed (and continues to perform) all reactor compartment removal and disposal work for the Navy; thus, the report suggests that all inactivation tasks be centralized at PSNS. Table 1.1 of the report lists the key events in the inactivation and disposal of a nuclear-powered submarine, including those unrelated to the propulsion system (such as missile compartment removal for ballistic missile submarines). One section of the report (pages 18-21) describes challenges in the storage of defueled reactor compartments at the Hanford Site. 
 Source:  http://www.dtic.mil/ 
 Date:   1992 
 Subject(s):  Hanford Site | Ship-Submarine Recycling Program (SRP) | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Nuclear-powered ships: Accounting for shipyard costs and nuclear waste disposal plans Add
 Summary:  This 1992 GAO report describes accounting practices at shipyards that perform nuclear work, using the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington as the basis for the review. The report describes the higher costs for nuclear work, compared with non-nuclear work, at PSNS, attributing them to "the complex nature of nuclear work, which requires a greater level of services, and the higher cost of specially trained and skilled workers and specialized shipyard departments that support nuclear work, such as radiological control, nuclear engineering, nuclear planning, and nuclear quality assurance" (3). Appendix III includes information on the disposal of hazardous waste, including defueled reactor compartments from decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines. 
 Source:  http://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-92-256 
 Date:  01 July 1992 
 Subject(s):  Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Text 
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 Title:  Nuclear-powered surface task force underway Add
 Summary:  The first nuclear-powered surface task force at sea, including the Enterprise, Long Beach, and Bainbridge. Later in 1964, the three ships performed a global circumnavigation as part of Operation Sea Orbit. 
 Source:  http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-b/dlgn25-k.htm1 
 Reference:  Duncan, Francis. Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1990, page 144. 
 Date:  18 June 1964 
 Subject(s):  A2W | C1W | D2G | USS Enterprise (CVN-65) | USS Long Beach (CGN-9) | USS Bainbridge (DLGN-25) | Naval Reactors 
 Type:  Image 
 Format:  JPEG 
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